This paper studies an infinite horizon adverse selection model with an underlying two-state Markov decision process. It introduces a novel approach that constructs the continuation payoff frontier exactly, as the fixed point of a functional operator. If the model supports an incentive compatible first-best (ICFB) contract, the continuation payoff frontier can be efficiently constructed, and the principal's optimal contracts converge to ICFB contracts over time. The existence of an ICFB contract is implied by the common assumption of private values and is a fairly general scenario. The paper generalizes some key findings in the dynamic adverse selection literature to this scenario.
1. Introduction. Dynamic principal-agent problems with hidden information (or adverse selection) under long-term contracting have been extensively studied in economics, but most of the literature focuses on special settings in which the hidden information is either constant or independent across periods (see examples and references in Salanie [21] , Laffont and Martimort [18] , and Bolton and Dewatripont [8] ). In recent years, the more general situation in which private information follows a Markov process (or Markov decision process) has received increasing attention. Examples include the endowment process studied by Fernandes and Phelan [13] , the consumer preference/taste process by Battaglini [4] and Zhang [27] , the income process by Doepke and Townsend [11] , the productivity process by Kapicka [16] , and the inventory process by Zhang et al. [25] . In this paper, we study a general adverse selection model with Markov dynamics and a risk-neutral agent over an infinite horizon, which has many potential applications in operations, economics, and other fields, as discussed in footnote 2.
Despite wide potential applications, the understanding of dynamic adverse selection problems with Markov transitions remains limited, both analytically and numerically. The optimal contracts are generally history dependent, and the history space grows exponentially fast. One mainstream approach to tackling such a problem is built on the pioneering work of Abreu, Pearce, and Stacchetti [1] (hereinafter APS), which computes a sequence of continuation payoff sets through backward induction and numerical approximations, as in Fernandes and Phelan [13] , Cole and Kocherlakota [9] , and Doepke and Townsend [11] . Although this successive approximation approach is widely applicable in theory, it is handicapped by the computational burden of the problem.
1 More importantly, it seems not well suited for probing the structure of the optimal solution.
Another mainstream approach in the adverse selection literature is the "first-order approach." This approach orders the states (types) from lowest to highest and solves at any public history a relaxed problem with only local incentive compatibility constraints (which prevent a type i + 1 agent from mimicing type i) and the participation constraint for the lowest type. This approach has been applied to two-state models in Battaglini [4] and Battaglini and Coate [5] and to continuous state models in Baron and Besanko [3] , Pavan [19] , Pavan et al. [20] , Kapicka [16] , etc. It has so far been more successful than the APS approach in exploring structural results. For instance, Battaglini [4] and Battaglini and Coate [5] identify two properties of the optimal contracts, "Generalized No Distortion at the Top" (GNDT) and "Vanishing Distortion at the Bottom" (VDB) in two-state models; and Besanko [7] finds a similar "vanishing distortion" property of the optimal contract in a continuous state model with a first-order autoregressive process. However, a fundamental challenge to this approach is the validity of the relaxation, as cautioned by Kocherlakota [17] . In dynamic environments, even with two states, the validation may require strong assumptions such as exogenous transitions, positive serial correlation, private values, and single-crossing reward/cost functions. It is not difficult to find examples that violate some of these assumptions and This paper extends the dynamic adverse selection model introduced in Zhang and Zenios [26] from finite horizon to infinite horizon, and it is accompanied by Zhang [24] , which analyzes the same infinite horizon model. However, while Zhang [24] focuses on iterative computation of the continuation payoff frontier and optimal contracts in the multi-state setting, this paper focuses on structural properties of the frontier and optimal contracts in the two-state setting, especially in the ICFB scenario. Structural results for dynamic adverse selection problems are important, as they are reminiscent of the celebrated results in the static setting. The existing results in the literature have raised questions about their generality because they are derived under restrictive model assumptions through the first-order approach. Our fixed-point construction approach is more flexible in that regard. Admittedly, the two-state assumption is restrictive. However, analysis of the two-state case is prevalent in the economics and operations literatures to provide a "proof of concept" and generate valuable insights for complex problems. By providing a thorough structural analysis to a large class of two-state models, this paper contributes to the current literature and may stimulate interesting applications in supply chain management, healthcare management, revenue management, etc.
Long-term efficiency has also been addressed in the dynamic mechanism design literature, e.g., Athey and Segal [2] , and Segal and Whinston [22] . These papers find that private values is a sufficient condition for the existence of efficient incentive compatible mechanisms, which also applies to the principal-agent setting. However, an efficient contract may allocate too much of the system profit to the agent at the expense of the principal. In this paper, we show that if there exists a socially efficient contract, an optimal contract for the principal is asymptotically efficient, which is a positive structural result. Efficiency has been studied in the literature on repeated games of incomplete information as well. The paper closest in setting to ours is Escobar and Toikka [12] , in which two players' private types evolve according to two independent Markov processes and efficiency can be achieved approximately when the discount factor is close to 1 by regulating the players' reported type distribution according to the true type distribution conditional on past reports. In contrast, our paper finds the optimal principal-agent contract exactly and shows its asymptotic efficiency regardless of the discount factor.
Finally, we note that the asymptotic efficiency of the optimal contract is driven by both the ICFB condition and risk neutrality of the agent. If no ICFB contract exists, the distortions (from efficiency) do not vanish over time (as demonstrated in Fig. 2 in Zhang [24] ). Similarly, if the agent is risk averse, the distortions may not vanish, as shown in Zhang [27] through a two-state continuous time model.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the general model and some basic results. Section 3 studies the two-state version of the model, focusing on the scenario when an ICFB contract exists. Section 4 further zooms in on the special case with private values and exogenous transitions and draws a close comparison between discrete and continuous action settings. We conclude in the last section. Proofs of the results are presented in the appendix.
A Dynamic Adverse Selection Model and Basic Results.
In this section, we discuss a dynamic adverse selection model, introduced by Zhang and Zenios [26] for the finite horizon setting and extended by Zhang [24] to the infinite horizon setting. We provide some basic facts of the model for the 2.1 Sequence of Events. At the beginning of period 1, the principal ("she") makes a take-it-orleave-it offer to the agent ("he") in the form of a long-term contract that covers T ≤ ∞ periods. If the agent accepts the offer, the following events take place in each subsequent period t. First, the agent privately observes the state of a Markov decision process, denoted by x t and drawn from a finite set X = {1, · · · , n}. Next, the agent takes a public action a t from a set A = {1, · · · , m} and incurs a cost c (at) xt . At the end of the period, the principal receives a reward r (at) xt , and then she pays the agent s t as governed by the contract, contingent upon publicly observable and verifiable information. Finally, the hidden state moves to x t+1 , with transition probabilities Pr(x t+1 = y|x t = x, a t = a), or simply p (a) xy . The transition matrix given a ∈ A is denoted by P (a) , whose x-th row (p x . The distribution of the initial state x 1 is publicly known and is described by a row vector β = (β x1 ) x1∈X . The total discounted payoff for the principal is xt − s t ), and that for the agent is xt ). The state history (x 1 , · · · , x t ) and action history (a 1 , · · · , a t ) are abbreviated as x t and a t , respectively. The beginning of period t will be referred to as time t. As in the standard contract theory literature, we assume that the state x t cannot be inferred or verified from the reward r (at) xt . 2 
Revelation Contracts.
The principal strives to design a long-term contract to maximize her expected total discounted payoff subject to the agent's incentive compatibility and participation constraints. Without loss of generality, she can focus on randomized revelation contracts, in the form
Under such a contract, the following events take place in any period t after any public history ( x t−1 , a t−1 ): the agent reports a state x t ; he takes an action a t ∈ A with prescribed probability θ t ( x t , a t ) such that at∈A θ t ( x t , a t−1 , a t ) = 1; and the principal pays the agent s t ( x t , a t ).
3
The contract can be recursively denoted by
is called a time-t continuation contract, which can be compactly written as
t+1,xt } xt∈X,at∈A by suppressing ( x t−1 , a t−1 ), moving x t to the subscript (without the "hat"), and moving a t to the superscript. The tuple (θ
t+1,xt ) at∈A given reported state x t is a submenu for state x t .
In the deterministic case, the contract is reduced to σ = {a 1 (
A revelation contract is a truthful revelation contract if it induces the agent to report the true state in every period. Under such a contract, the agent, principal, and system's expected future payoffs, or continuation payoffs, from state x t onward can be recursively expressed as:
In the above expressions, u(σ t+1 ) = (u xt+1 (σ t+1 )) xt+1∈X , π(σ t+1 ) = (π xt+1 (σ t+1 )) xt+1∈X , and φ(σ t+1 ) = 2 This model has many applications (some transformations may be needed-e.g., switching the rewards and costs). Examples include: a supplier sells to strategic consumers with changing preference types, as in Battaglini [4] (generalized in Theorem 4.3 later); a government taxes individuals with changing income generation abilities, as in Battaglini and Coate [5] ; an investor finances a project that generates cash flows correlated in time, similar to the problem studied in Tchistyi [23] ; and a supplier sells to a retailer who holds inventories privately, as in Zhang et al. [25] (the long-term contracting version is relevant). Two additional examples are mentioned in Zhang and Zenios [26] : Medicare compensates a healthcare provider who has private knowledge about its patients' health status, and an investor contracts with the manager of a new venture with a changing state (e.g., the success probability).
(φ xt+1 (σ t+1 )) xt+1∈X are column vectors, and pu is the matrix multiplication of a row vector with a column vector. Thus, every time-t truthful continuation contract σ t generates continuation payoff vectors u(σ t ), π(σ t ), and φ(σ t ) at the beginning of period t.
Principal's Problem and Continuation Payoff
Frontier. The problem of finding an optimal revelation contract can be recast as a problem of finding optimal continuation payoffs, called the submenu problem or auxiliary planning problem. Given any continuation payoff vector promised to the agent at time t, u t , the latter problem finds the maximum continuation payoff for the system from any state x t , φ * t,xt (u t ), by optimally choosing probabilities {θ (at) xt } at∈A and time-(t + 1) continuation payoff vectors for the agent, {v
Combining the solutions to all submenu problems, we obtain a vector valued function φ * t (·), called the time-t continuation payoff frontier. The set of feasible u t 's, denoted by U t and determined by the IC constraints (5) endogenously, is called the time-t continuation agent payoff set. The function φ * t+1 (·) and the set U t+1 in the problem formulation are the continuation payoff frontier and continuation agent payoff set at time t + 1, respectively. Thus, the problem is recursively defined. The x t -th component of φ * t (·)-i.e., φ * t,xt (·)-will be referred to as a (time-t continuation payoff) frontier component. The incentive compatibility (IC) constraints (5) ensure that the submenu intended for state x t does not trigger a misreport in any other state x t . To see this, if the agent reports the state x t truthfully, his continuation payoff at time t would be u t,xt = at∈A θ
xt }; if he reports x t but the true state is x t , his continuation payoff would be u t,xt|x t = at∈A θ
xt }. Thus, constraints (5) are equivalent to u t,x t ≥ u t,xt|x t . The IC constraints also suggest that there is a degree of freedom in the agent's continuation payoffs and it would be convenient to consider his relative continuation payoffs u t,x t − u t,xt , x t = x t .
At time 1, given the continuation payoff frontier φ * 1 (·), the principal solves the problem max u1∈U1 {β (φ * 1 (u 1 ) − u 1 ) : u 1 ≥ 0}, assuming that the agent knows the initial state x 1 when signing the contract. Participation constraints are unnecessary when finding φ * t (·) because they can be satisfied by transferring payments across periods.
We study the infinite horizon version of the principal's problem in this paper. Each iteration in the backward induction-from the continuation payoff frontier φ * t+1 (·) to φ * t (·)-defines a functional operator, referred to as the value iteration operator and denoted by Γ * (the time index is omitted because the operator is essentially independent of t). The iteration can be conveniently written as φ * t (·) = Γ * φ * t+1 (·). It can be shown that: over the infinite horizon, the agent's relative continuation payoff set is a unique compact and convex set, denoted by U ⊂ R n−1 ; from a bounded continuous function φ *
is the unique fixed point of the operator Γ * , and the continuation payoff frontier is the same in all periods. In the rest of this paper, we will concentrate on the fixed point φ *
[∞] (·) and remove the index [∞] (and other time indices) for simplicity.
2.4 Two-State Formulation. The two-state version of the model is investigated in this paper, with state set X = {1, 2}. Unlike the convention in the literature, we do not label the states as H and L because they need not have a physical order in general. As suggested above, we replace the agent's absolute continuation payoff vector u = (u 1 , u 2 ) by his relative continuation payoff u = u 1 − u 2 , which lies in a compact interval U = [u, u] . Replacing vectors u t and {v (at) xt } in the submenu problem (4)-(6) by scalars u and {v (a)
x }, and using the fact that (p
, we arrive at the following simplified submenu problems:
and
The continuation payoff frontier components φ * 1 (·) and φ * 2 (·) can be depicted in a two-dimensional space, and a continuation payoff pair (u, φ) can be represented by two component points (u, φ 1 ) and (u, φ 2 ) in this space. To help construct the frontier components, we define an operator Γ (a)
for each x ∈ X and a ∈ A, which maps a continuation payoff pair (v, ψ) ∈ R 3 to a component point
x (v, ψ) as follows:
Given x and a, applying Γ (a) x to the continuation payoff frontier φ * (·) point by point, we obtain an intermediate function
If the IC constraints (8) and (11) were equalities, the frontier component φ * x (·) would be the convex hull of the intermediate functions {φ (8) is an inequality, any feasible solution to the problem (7)-(9) with parameter u must be feasible to the problem with parameter u ≤ u , and hence φ * 1 (u ) ≥ φ * 1 (u ) for any u ≤ u . In effect, the inequality (8) introduces a projection along the −u direction, making the left tail of φ * 1 (·) flat. 5 Similarly, the continuation payoff frontier component
is the convex hull of the intermediate functions {φ 2 (·)} a∈A , with a flat right tail. An example is illustrated in Fig. 1 (more details will be given in Example 3.1 later).
3. Solving the Model under the Incentive Compatible First Best Condition. In this section, we investigate the two-state model, focusing on the scenario in which an incentive compatible first-best contract exists. It is an important case with wide applicability.
3.1 Fixed-Point Construction Approach. Because the continuation payoff frontier φ * (·) is a fixed point of the value iteration operator, it can be constructed in a circular fashion: the intermediate functions {φ x (·)} can be created from the frontier components {φ * x (·)} through the affine transformations defined in (15) , while the frontier components {φ * x (·)} can be obtained from the intermediate functions through convex hull operations and projections. In some situations, as will soon be seen, this circular 5 By lowering the payments {s (a) 1 } a∈A , the principal can reduce the agent's continuation payoff in state 1 (or his relative continuation payoff u 1 − u 2 ) and relax the IC constraint (8) (as the agent is discouraged from misrepresenting state 2 as state 1) while keeping the system payoff unchanged. The payment variables are implicit in the problem formulation. structure enables us to determine the continuation payoff frontier directly. This fixed-point construction approach is more effective than the successive approximation approach (as in Abreu et al. [1] , Fernandes and Phelan [13] , Cole and Kocherlakota [9] , and Doepke and Townsend [11] ) in exploring the structures of the continuation payoff frontier and the associated optimal contracts; it is more versatile than the first-order approach (as in Battaglini [4] , Battaglini and Coate [5] , Baron and Besanko [3] , and Pavan et al. [20] ) because it requires weaker assumptions on model primitives.
In the infinite horizon setting, the limiting behavior of optimal contracts is particularly important. It has been shown in the literature (such as Battaglini [4] , Battaglini and Coate [5] , and Besanko [7] ) that under some dynamic adverse selection models the optimal contracts converge to some stationary contracts over time. In this section, we are about to show that this is a fairly general result, at least in the two-state case, and to uncover the driving force behind it. A natural first step to that end is to characterize all stationary contracts that may be part of an optimal contract. As will be seen in Subsection 3.3, for a large class of models, among all stationary contracts we only need to focus on the first-best ones. Before studying contracts constructed from multiple actions, we first examine the behavior of an individual action and the stationary contracts created from a single action.
Behavior of Individual Actions.
To study the behavior of an individual action a, we combine the operators {Γ x ) x∈X that maps a continuation payoff pair (v, ψ) ∈ R 3 to another pair (u, φ) (a) ∈ R 3 according to Eqs. (13) and (14) . The resulting vector (u, φ) (a) gives the agent's and system's continuation payoffs if action a and next-period continuation payoffs (v, ψ) are chosen in both states. For any discount factor δ ∈ [0, 1), each operator Γ (a) has a unique fixed point in the R 3 space, denoted by ( u, φ) (a) and called the absorbing continuation payoff pair or simply the absorbing point under action a:
where I is the identity matrix. The vector ( u, φ) (a) corresponds to a stationary contract created from action a alone, i.e., action a is chosen in all periods and states. 6 The absorbing points have the following properties: 6 To construct an incentive compatible contract from a single action a, the payment s ; if λ (a) < 0, Γ (a) draws a continuation payoff pair closer to the absorbing point while throwing it to the opposite side of the absorbing point in the u dimension; and if λ (a) = 0, Γ (a) maps any continuation payoff pair into the degenerate plane u ≡ u (a) in which the absorbing point locates. Intuitively, when more and more periods with action a taken are attached to the front of any given contract, the augmented contract will behave more and more like the stationary contract created from action a alone, although the exact manner of convergence depends on the transition probabilities.
In the above cases, the transition matrix P (a) is positive definite, indefinite, and singular, respectively (and the states before and after the action are positively correlated, negatively correlated, and independent, respectively). Thus, the action will be referred to as positive definite, indefinite, or singular, correspondingly. By Eq. (15) and the above proposition, an intermediate function φ x (·) created by a positive definite action is proportional to a weighted average of the component functions {φ * x (·)}, pulled toward u (a) , and one created by an indefinite action is also proportional to a weighted average of {φ * x (·)}, but flipped around u (a) . This distinction will lead to the different ways that positive definite and indefinite actions shape the continuation payoff frontier.
Incentive Compatible First Best (ICFB) Condition.
In the first-best scenario, the state x is public information, and the principal simply maximizes the expected total system payoff without the agent's incentive compatibility constraints. The optimal solution to such a problem is a stationary deterministic policy a x x∈X that specifies an action a x for each state x in all periods. Under such a policy, the transition matrix, the principal's one-period reward vector, and the agent's one-period cost vector are given by
, and c a1,a2 = c
, respectively, and the expected total system payoff vector can be computed as (similar to Eq. (17)):
If a 1 = a 2 = a, φ a1,a2 becomes the absorbing system payoff vector φ
given a.
Denote an optimal stationary deterministic policy by a * x x∈X and the corresponding system payoff vector φ a by φ * , which will be referred to as a (stationary) first-best policy and the first-best continuation system payoff vector, respectively. In general, a first-best policy can be identified through the policy iteration method introduced by Howard [14] ; in the two-state case, it may also be found by directly evaluating all possible action pairs. In the remainder of this paper, we safely assume that a first-best policy can be easily found.
If the state is the agent's private information, a first-best solution may not survive the incentive compatibility constraints. Even if it is still incentive compatible, it is generally not optimal for the principal because of the high information rent yielded to the agent. The latter scenario, in which an incentive compatible first-best contract exists, highlights the tension between system efficiency and information rent. We will refer to this scenario as the ICFB scenario and the model as supporting ICFB or meeting the ICFB condition.
The ICFB scenario includes a prominent special case. In the contract theory literature, a commonly made assumption is "private values," in which the hidden state (or the agent's private type) does not affect the principal's one-period reward. Many interesting problems fall into this category. We have the following result:
x ≡ r (a) ), there exists an ICFB contract.
Proof. It suffices to identify an ICFB contract. If the principal pays the agent r (a) following any action a, the agent will capture the entire system payoff r
in any state and any period, after any action. 7 Thus, in every state, the agent will select an action that maximizes the continuation system payoff. Consequently, this simple contract is incentive compatible and achieves the first-best continuation system payoff in any state.
As shown in the proof, the private value assumption enables the principal to align the agent's incentive with the system objective and induce first-best actions.
8 However, the simple contract in the proof allocates all system payoffs to the agent, which is clearly unacceptable to the principal. More sophisticated contracts are preferred by the principal to strike a balance between system efficiency and information rent extraction.
Note that the private value assumption does not depend on the underlying system dynamics, which suggests the generality of the ICFB scenario. The next theorem identifies some necessary and sufficient conditions for ICFB, which do depend on the underlying dynamics. (ii ) The continuation payoff frontier φ * (·) is locally efficient-i.e., it attains the first-best system payoff vector φ * over a non-empty interval of the agent's relative continuation payoffs, denoted
is the largest interval that can be generated by any a * 
When a first-best contract is incentive compatible, it is a feasible contract that generates a relative continuation payoff u for the agent and a first-best continuation payoff vector φ * for the system. Hence, the φ * vector is attained by at least one u, and we see that statement (i) implies (ii). Conversely, if φ * is attained over a non-empty interval [u * 2 , u * 1 ] of the agent's relative continuation payoffs, the submenus that create points (u * 1 , φ * 1 ) and (u * 2 , φ * 2 ), respectively, can be combined to form an incentive compatible firstbest contract, and hence (ii) implies (i).
9 These two statements establish the correspondence between 7 Although the one-period reward is often non-verifiable and cannot be contracted upon, the contract can legitimately utilize the publicly known function r (a) and observable action a.
8 This result holds in more general multi-agent mechanism design problems; see, e.g., Athey and Segal [2] , and Segal and Whinston [22] . 9 To construct an ICFB contract that generates a given relative continuation payoff u * ∈ [u * 2 , u * 1 ] for the agent, we need to combine the first-best action plan with a proper payment plan. For the ease of exposition, assume that the first-best actions {a * x } are positive definite; in all other cases, we just need to replace u * 1 by u * 2 and/or u * 2 by u * 1 in the discussion below. Consider a deterministic contract {ax, sx, vx} x∈X in any period, where vx is the agent's absolute continuation payoff vector from the next period onward if the current state is reportedly x. First, choose the first-best action a * x for
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The equivalence between statements (iii) and (iv) is trivial. The equivalence between (ii) and (iii) is proved in the appendix. Statement (iii) says that there exists a first-best policy a * 1 , a * 2 such that action a * 1 is better at generating continuation payoff for the agent in state 1 and a * 2 is better at generating the payoff in state 2, because u
by the definition of relative continuation payoffs. Such a combination aligns the agent's incentive with the system objective and enables an ICFB contract. Thus, the theorem also reveals the relationship between ICFB contracts and the long-term behavior of individual actions.
The example below demonstrates the continuation payoff frontier in the ICFB (but not private value) scenario.
Example 3.1 Consider a model with four actions {1, 2, 3, 4}, discount factor δ = 0.9, and the following parameters: Notice that actions 1 and 3 are positive definite (inducing positive serial correlation), and actions 2 and 4 are indefinite (inducing negative serial correlation). The absorbing points, first-best policy, first-best continuation system payoff vector, efficient domain, and the agent's relative continuation payoff set can be found as: The ICFB condition is satisfied because
The frontier components {φ * x (·)} and intermediate functions {φ An example violating the ICFB condition is discussed in Zhang [24] (Example 1) in detail, which has two states, two actions, and the following parameters: δ = 0.95, (c
. The first-best policy is a * 1 , a * 2 = 2, 1 , the absorbing relative continuation payoffs for the agent are u (1) ≈ 3.810 and u (2) ≈ −0.637, and thus the ICFB condition u
2 ) is violated. In that example, the action plan that minimizes the agent's cost is a 1 , a 2 = 1, 2 , and therefore the agent's incentive is not aligned with the system. As a result, the first-best contract is not incentive compatible and the first-best continuation system payoff vector state x, i.e., let ax = a * x . Second, choose v 1 and v 2 so that their relative values are u * 1 and u * 2 , respectively, and hence
A simple choice would be v 1 = (u * 1 , 0) and v 2 = (u * 2 , 0). Third, from the deterministic version of Eq. (1), we have ux = sx −c
Thus, to generate a given relative continuation payoff u * , we choose payments {sx} such that
21 u * 2 . Now, we show that the contract is ICFB. By the definition of u * x and positive definity of a * x , we have
, and hence both IC constraints (8) and (11) are satisfied at u * . By Eq. (14) and the definition of φ * x , we obtain φx = r
x , and hence the contract is first best. Clearly, due to the flexibility in choosing {vx} and {sx}, the above construction is non-unique. 10 Assuming c cannot be attained. The continuation payoff frontier for that example (Fig. 2, Zhang [24] ) is drastically different from the one for Example 3.1. x (·)} enables them to be pinned down in an orderly fashion.
First, because the continuation payoff for the system can never exceed the first best, the top of the continuation payoff frontier is given by the efficient segment of the frontier, identified in Theorem 3.1. Then, from the first-best component points (u * 1 , φ * 1 ) and (u * 2 , φ * 2 ), other extreme points can be determined like water cascading down from the top. These extreme points can be classified into consecutive generations, with the k-th generation descended from the (k − 1)-th and generation 0 comprising the first-best component points (u * 1 , φ * 1 ) and (u * 2 , φ * 2 ). We imagine a directed graph of the extreme points of {φ * x (·)} by drawing an arrow from the immediate ancestor of each extreme point to that extreme point, as in Fig. 2 (the number next to an extreme point is its generation index). The algorithm below creates the first K generations of {φ * x (·)}'s extreme points. Let A p , A n , and A s denote the sets of positive definite, indefinite, and singular actions, respectively, and let x = x.
Inputs: first-best continuation system payoff vector φ * and efficient domain [u *
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At the beginning of the k-th iteration, the sets S * x and E * x contain φ * x (·)'s extreme-point candidates that belong to the (k − 1)-th generation and the first k − 1 generations, respectively. Step 1 of the inner loop computes the k-th generation of the intermediate functions' extreme-point candidates created by nonsingular actions. 11 In step 2, the extreme-point candidates created by singular actions are added; this step is only needed in the first iteration because no other candidates can be created by singular actions. 12 In step 3, all newly created candidates are added to the set E *
x . In step 4, the convex hull of E * x is identified, and all of its vertices are kept in E * x , because the first k generations of φ * x (·)'s extreme points must lie on this convex hull. After the inner loop, those vertices belonging to the k-th generation are stored in S * x . From the perspective of contracts, the efficient segment of the continuation payoff frontier corresponds to the set of first-best contracts to which the optimal contracts may converge. The above algorithm conducts backward induction from these first-best contracts, attaching more and more inefficient periods at the front. A k-th generation extreme point of φ * x (·) is created by adding k inefficient periods to a first-best contract.
After K iterations, all of φ * x (·)'s extreme points belonging to the first K generations are contained in the set E * x , although E * x may also contain candidates that will be eliminated in future iterations. As will become clear in Subsection 3.5, to construct an optimal contract for a given initial state distribution, only a finite portion of the continuation payoff frontier is relevant, and we just need to set K large enough. In some situations, K can be precisely determined-e.g., when there are no indefinite actions, {φ * x (·)}'s first L extreme points can be found in O(mL 2 ) time (the algorithm is available from the author). 
for some p (a) ∈ (0, 1). In this case, all actions are singular, and the continuation payoff frontier can be determined by just one iteration. According to the discussion in the next subsection, because all non-first-best extreme points are directly descended from the first-best ones, an optimal contract derived from such a continuation payoff frontier would consist of an optimal static contract in the first period and first-best contracts from the second period onward. The continuation payoff frontier provides a new perspective to this well-known result.
We show next that if the extreme-point graph contains no cycle other than the one(s) involving the first-best component points, the above algorithm is bound to find all extreme points. Intuitively, if no optimal contract contains an infinitely long inefficient path, any optimal contract can be found by backward induction from a first-best contract in finitely many steps. The theorem below gives a simple condition that prevents an inefficient cycle in the extreme-point graph, which would lead to an infinitely long inefficient path in the optimal contracts. 21 ∈ (0, 1) is specified in the theorem. Actions violating this condition might create unwanted cycles or "sink" points, which can be viewed as a degenerate case. A detailed discussion of degeneracy is omitted here due to space limitation. Degenerate cycles or points are not descended from the first-best component points and hence cannot be identified by the algorithm precisely. However, they can still be found approximately because each iteration of the algorithm is basically a special value iteration.
11 More precisely, the (relevant) extreme-point candidates of φ Fig. 2 ). 12 If a is singular, the extreme point of φ 
For an action a with an identity transition matrix, its absorbing component point ( u (a) , φ (a)
x ), for x ∈ X, may be an extreme point of φ * x (·). An optimal contract derived from such a continuation payoff frontier can be trapped by such an extreme point and lose the property of asymptotic efficiency discussed in the next subsection. This reinterprets the well-known result that the optimal contract in the constant state case consists of optimal static contracts and is typically inefficient (even under private values).
3.5 Properties of Optimal Contracts. When the continuation payoff frontier φ * (·) is obtained, an optimal long-term contract with respect to any initial state distribution β can be constructed straightforwardly, and its properties can be explored conveniently. u 2 ) , while the continuation payoff frontier studied in previous subsections is in the form of φ * (u), based on the agent's relative continuation payoff u = u 1 − u 2 . Thus, we rewrite the problem as max u∈U {β(φ
Clearly, at an optimal solution u * , one of its coordinates must be zero, and u * must take the form (u, 0) for some u ≥ 0 or (0, −u) for some u ≤ 0. Then, the problem can be transformed into max u∈ U {βφ
where U = [u, u] is the agent's relative continuation payoff set, and ρ(u) = β 1 u,
. In the objective function, βφ * (·) and ρ(·) represent the expected continuation system payoff and expected information rent, respectively. Because βφ * (·) is concave and ρ(·) is convex, the objective function βφ * (·) − ρ(·) is concave, and a maximizer can be easily identified. Various parts of the objective function are demonstrated in Fig. 3: panel (a) illustrates the case in which the agent's relative continuation payoff set [u, u] contains zero, and panel (b) illustrates the case in which the entire interval lies on the positive half of the u axis. The third case, in which the interval lies on the negative half of the axis, is symmetric to case (b). The optimal u * to the principal's time-1 problem identifies an extreme point of φ * (·), and the optimal contract corresponding to u * can be unfolded by tracing back the ancestors of the extreme point.
14,15 3.5.2 Asymptotic Efficiency and Asymptotic Renegotiation Proofness. If the model meets the ICFB condition and is non-degenerate, by Theorem 3.2 and the algorithm described in Subsection 3.4, the process of unfolding an optimal contract must end at the first-best component points in finite time and then cycle within them forever.
16 Theorem 3.2 and the algorithm immediately imply:
Under the assumptions of Theorem 3.2, given any initial state distribution, the optimal contract possesses the following properties:
, the contract will be first best from then on;
(ii ) (Vanishing Distortion at the Bottom) If the agent keeps reporting state 1 when u ∈ (u * 1 , u] or 2 when u ∈ [u, u * 2 ), the contract will still converge to a first-best contract. 13 Parts of Subsubsections 3.5.1, 3.5.3, and 3.5.4 are also presented in Zhang [24] . 14 In the case illustrated in Fig. 3(a) , it is possible that u * = 0, lying between two adjacent extreme points of φ * (·).
In such a case, the optimal contract is obtained by randomizing between the optimal contracts associated with those two extreme points. 15 Let σ(u) denote the optimal continuation contract that generates the relative continuation payoff u for the agent. The continuation payoff frontier φ * (·) has an extreme point at a given u if one of its components has an extreme point at u.
The x-th submenu of σ(u) can be determined from the frontier component φ * x (·) as follows. If φ * x (·) has an extreme point at u, it must be obtained through (u, φ * x (u)) = Γ (a )
x (u , φ * (u )) from some action a and relative continuation payoff u , and the x-th submenu should consist of action a and continuation contract σ(u ). Otherwise, the continuation system payoff φ * x (u) must be generated by a nearby extreme point of φ * x (·), as in Fig. 2 when u lies within the flat region of φ * x (·), and the x-th submenu should borrow the action and continuation contract from that extreme point (the discrepancy between the relative continuation payoffs can be resolved by the transfer payments {s (·)
x }; see a related discussion in footnote 9. 16 When the action set is continuous, as in Subsection 4.2, the convergence may take infinite time. That is, if the agent reveals a "good" state at any time (as defined in part (i) of the theorem), the contract will be first best from then on; even along the history path on which the reported states are always "bad," the contract will still converge to a first-best contract (when indefinite actions are present, this worst path may alternate between states 1 and 2). These properties generalize the ones discussed in Battaglini [4] and Battaglini and Coate [5] . Their models are special cases of ours, with private values, exogenous transitions, positive definite and non-degenerate actions, and special forms of reward and cost functions, to enable the first-order approach (which is characterized by ordering the states and truncating the incentive compatibility constraints). In contrast, our approach does not require any restriction on the state order or the incentive compatibility constraints, and thus it only needs weak assumptions on the model. Because private values alone implies ICFB, ICFB is an essentially broader scenario and the generalization is significant.
The above two properties of optimal contracts can be combined into one, asymptotic efficiencyi.e., an optimal contract converges to an ICFB contract asymptotically. It is well known that a first-best contract is renegotiation proof. Thus, an optimal contract characterized above is renegotiation proof after a finite number of periods (if the action set is discrete). In an infinite horizon setting, this asymptotic renegotiation proofness can be arguably as good as renegotiation proofness from the beginning because it is not unrealistic to assume that the two parties can refrain from immediate renegotiations after signing a long-term contract. In fact, renegotiation proofness under an asymptotically efficient contract can start before the first best is reached. Special cases of this result can be found in Battaglini [4] and Battaglini and Coate [5] . A detailed discussion is omitted here to save space.
Trade-off Between System Efficiency and Information
Rent. An optimal contract strikes a balance between system efficiency maximization and information rent extraction. A first-best contract can achieve the highest system efficiency but may yield too much information rent to the agent, and hence it may be sub-optimal for the principal. As an example, consider Fig. 3(b) , where a first-best contract can be implemented by conceding an expected information rent of ρ(u * 2 ) = β 1 u * 2 (or more) to the agent. The extreme point of φ * (·) on the immediate left of u * 2 corresponds to a contract that attaches an inefficient action (in state 2) in front of a first-best contract. This distortion reduces the agent's information rent at the expense of system efficiency-both ρ(u) and βφ * (u) are reduced. An optimal contract equalizes the expected marginal system efficiency (the slope of βφ * (·)) and expected marginal information rent (the slope of ρ(·)).
From the perspective of the continuation payoff frontier, first-best efficiency can only be achieved in a limited range of the agent's continuation payoffs (in the efficient domain [u * 2 , u * 1 ]). Attaching nonfirst-best actions in front of the first-best ones expands the set of continuation payoffs attainable by the contracts but results in efficiency loss. Following the algorithm, as the generation indices increase, the extreme points move further away from the efficient domain. The optimal extreme point depends on the comparison between the loss of system efficiency and the reduction of information rent.
Impact of the Initial State
Distribution. An implication of the above discussion is that given any initial state distribution β, only a finite portion of the continuation payoff frontier is needed to construct an optimal contract, which can be obtained in finite time through the algorithm. The discussion also helps reveal the impact of the initial state distribution on the optimal contract. Consider Fig. 3(b) again. Because the slope of φ * 1 (·) is always 0 in the pertinent region, the slope of βφ * (·) is solely determined by β 2 φ * 2 (·). Thus, we are comparing the slope of β 2 φ * 2 (·) with β 1 , or the slope of φ * 2 (·) with β 1 /β 2 . If β 1 (and hence β 1 /β 2 ) increases, the optimal u * should move to the left. Intuitively, when β 1 increases, the agent's information rent in state 1 (or relative continuation payoff u in this example) becomes more undesirable to the principal, and thus a less efficient contract that gives up less information rent in state 1 may become more appealing.
Solving the Model under Private Values and Exogenous Transitions.
In the last section, we showed that under the fairly general ICFB condition, the continuation payoff frontier and associated optimal contracts have fine structures and can be conveniently constructed. In this section, we impose two assumptions commonly made in the literature, with which even stronger results can be obtained. x are independent of x and can be simplified to r (a) .
Assumption 4.2 (Exogenous Transitions)
The transition matrices P (a) are independent of a and can be simplified to P .
By Proposition 3.2, private values implies ICFB. Exogenous transitions implies that the underlying
system is an uncontrollable Markov process, which has many applications such as the endowment process in Fernandes and Phelan [13] , the consumer preference process in Battaglini [4] , and the cash flow process in Tchistyi [23] . Under these assumptions, a first-best policy a * 1 , a * 2 can be derived immediately from Eq. In this section, we thoroughly investigate the continuation payoff frontier and optimal contracts under these two assumptions, and we compare the discrete and continuous action settings. We show that in the former setting, the extreme points of the continuation payoff frontier can be generated in linear time, and that in the latter the (smooth) frontier can be described by a set of delay differential equations. Besides the value of studying these models individually in their own right, the comparison between the two demonstrates the robustness of the results obtained by the fixed-point construction approach and generates valuable insights that are hardly available in the existing literature, such as the quality of discretization and complexity of optimal contracts. The positive definity assumption is inessential to the pattern, but it conveniently separates φ * 1 (·) and φ * 2 (·) so that each can be constructed independently. In this example, only φ * 2 (·) is constructed, because when u * 2 > 0, only the (trivial) flat portion of φ * 1 (·) (= φ * 1 ) is relevant. 18 The above first-best point is determined by the first-best actions, other than actions 1, 2, and 3. For the sake of a subsequent comparison, the point is computed from a continuous action example discussed in the next subsection.
Discrete Action Setting. Under the exogenous transition assumption, the intermediate functions {φ
absorbing points can be found to be (0, 0, 0), (1.5625, 29.375, 27.8125), and (3.125, 48.75, 45.625) , respectively. The functions φ * 2 (·) and {φ (a) 2 (·)} are illustrated in Fig. 4(a) . The table below exhibits that the i-th extreme point of φ * 2 (·) coincides with the j-th extreme point of φ As Fig. 4(a) shows, the extreme points of φ * x (·) and {φ The proposition is illustrated in Fig. 4(a) with x = 2(= y) . Part (i) follows from Eq. (15) and the exogenous transition assumption, Part (ii) suggests that the common tangent of φ x (·) that contributes to φ * x (·) can be easily identified from its first extreme point. As a result of this proposition, the extreme points of {φ * x (·)} can be sequentially generated by efficiently handling their double indices. A linear time algorithm is given in the proof of the next theorem. Because it even takes linear time to enumerate the extreme points, this is as fast as it gets.
Theorem 4.1 Under the private value and exogenous transition assumptions, the first L extreme points of {φ * x (·)} can be created in O(L) time.
As discussed in footnote 15, an optimal contract can be constructed by backtracking the ancestors of the extreme points, starting from the extreme point determined by the initial state distribution. When the actions are positive definite (states are positively serially correlated), as in Example 4.1 and Fig. 4(a) , the optimal action policy {a t (x t )} x t ∈X t ,t=1,2,··· has the VDB and GNDT properties: if the reported state has always been 2 up to the current time t (i.e., x t = (2, · · · , 2)), the optimal action a t is the action that created the current extreme point, and the extreme point is traced one step back, which will lead to the first-best component point (u * 2 , φ * 2 ) in finite time;
20 otherwise, the optimal action is the first-best action a * xt for the current state x t . When the actions are indefinite (states are negatively serially correlated), the optimal action policy is similar; however, along the reported state path (2, 1, 2, 1, · · · ), it will alternate between φ * 2 (·) and φ * 1 (·)'s extreme points until a first-best component point is reached. As will be seen in Theorem 4.3 below, similar results hold in the continuous action setting. 
where y = y as usual. The point (z (a)
x , ρ (a)
x ) corresponds to the first extreme point of φ (a)
x (·) in the discrete action setting, q (a)
2 ) traces a continuous curve and defines an implicit function
. 21 The functions {ρ x (·)} are completely determined by model primitives δ, {r (a) }, {c (a)
x }, P , and the induced first-best points {(u * x , φ * )}, and hence they are exogenously given. x (·)} a∈A along the continuation payoff frontier φ * x (·), which is in turn implied by the exogenous transition assumption. 21 If the trace of (z
x ) is discontinuous or is a correspondance rather than a function, we consider its upper convex hull, as in the discrete action setting.
(i ) The intermediate functions {φ (a) x (·)} a∈A have an identical shape and are proportional to the frontier component φ * y (·), as described below, for y = x if p 11 − p 21 > 0 or y = x if p 11 − p 21 < 0:
(ii ) For any action a, if φ (a)
(iii ) For any action a, the intermediate function φ 
The frontier components {φ * x (·)} and intermediate functions {φ As the next theorem shows, expressions (21) and (22) 
, can be uniquely solved from the following set of equations:
where y = x if p 11 − p 21 > 0 and y = x if p 11 − p 21 < 0.
Eqs. (23) and (24) imply that
Thus, the derivative of a frontier component at any point u is determined by the derivative of this function (or its counterpart) at another point u−z δ(p11−p21) + u * y . Such equations are called (neutral ) delay differential equations in the literature; a detailed discussion of examples and solution methods can be found in Bellen and Zennaro [6] . Theorem 4.2 proves the existence and uniqueness of the solution to our model, and it also reveals that the frontier components can be constructed from the top down, as in the discrete action setting. The construction can always be done numerically. When the ρ x (·) functions have simple expressions, analytical solutions may be available. As a non-trivial example, we revisit the problem studied in Battaglini [4] , in which the principal is a monopolistic seller and the agent is a buyer with a private type x ∈ {1, 2} (or {H, L}) that changes as a stationary Markov process; for a units of product in any period, the seller's production cost is a 2 2 and the buyer's valuation is θ x a, with θ 1 > θ 2 . This problem can be cast as a special case of ours, in which the principal receives negative rewards and the agent incurs negative costs. The problem is solved below. We say that the reported state history x t is along the path (s 1 , s 2 , s 3 , · · · ) if x τ = s τ for all τ = 1, 2, · · · , t. x = −θ x a, respectively, for any a drawn from a sufficiently large interval [a, a]. Assume that θ 1 > θ 2 > 0 and transition probabilities p 11 = p 21 ∈ (0, 1). Define
Then, the continuation payoff frontier is given by φ *
Define two paths X low = (2, 2, 2, · · · ) and X alter = (2, 1, 2, 1, · · · ). Then, the optimal action policy, contingent on the report history x t , is given by:
and hence along the path X low , a t (x t ) → θ 2 as t → ∞;
, if x t is along X alter and t = 2s − 1,
, if x t is along X alter and t = 2s,
and hence along the path X alter , a 2s−1 (x 2s−1 ) → θ 2 and a 2s (x 2s ) → θ 1 as s → ∞.
In the above model, the implicit peak functions have a quadratic form,
, which results in a linear relationship between the variables u and z that satisfy (23) and (24) for a given x: Fig. 4(b) under model parameters δ = 0.9, p 11 = 0.6, p 21 = 0.2, θ 1 = 4, and θ 2 = 3. The intermediate functions φ The assumption θ 1 > θ 2 > 0 implies that type 1 is the "high" type and type 2 the "low" type in terms of the buyer's valuation. The positive definity (positive serial correlation) assumption p 11 − p 21 > 0 suggests that a high (low) type is more likely to result from a high (low) type in the previous period.
Based on the more general fixed-point construction approach, the above theorem extends Battaglini's [4] results in two important ways: it provides a full characterization of the continuation payoff frontier, and it includes the negative serial correlation case. The theorem suggests that whether the types are positively or negatively serially correlated, there is an inefficient path, X low or X alter . Inefficient actions are taken along and only along this path. It is interesting that in the negative serial correlation case, the high type (type 1) is not always "good": along the inefficient path, the information rent requested by type 1 relative to that by type 2 is much larger in even periods than in odd periods, which makes the high type unfavorable in even periods. Facing a "swing" buyer whose type is likely to switch, due to p 11 − p 21 < 0, the seller alternates between under-production and over-production along the inefficient path (notice that (p 11 − p 21 ) 2s−2 > 0 and (p 11 − p 21 ) 2s−1 < 0 in expression (26)), which is a novel finding. Nevertheless, the actions still converge to the efficient ones over time.
Remark 4.1
The action set [a, a] is assumed large enough in the theorem so that the solution to the model is not muddled by terminal effects. However, as can be seen, a 1 (x 1 ) in expression (25) would be negative if θ 2 < β1 β2 (θ 1 − θ 2 ). If negative actions are unacceptable, we should either characterize the impact of the boundary action explicitly or make proper assumptions on the model parameters like the one made in Battaglini [4] , β1 β2 < θ2 θ1−θ2 . In Fig. 4(b) , we assumed a = 0, to be comparable with the discrete action case in Fig. 4(a) , and precisely characterized φ * 2 (·) over the interval [0,ǔ
2 ]. We find that, if θ 2 < β1 β2 (θ 1 − θ 2 ), the optimal action policy in expression (25) should be modified such that a t (x t ) = 0 along the inefficient path until θ 2 − β1 β2 ( p11−p21 p22
θ1−θ2 ), the seller should avoid the low type (type 2) initially so that more information rents can be extracted along other more efficient paths. Figs. 4(a) and 4(b) , and the corresponding optimal contracts) testifies to the versatility of the fixed-point construction approach and the robustness of the structural results.
Comparison of
The reader may have observed that the model in Example 4.1 is a discrete version of the continuous action model analyzed in Theorem 4.3 with parameters δ = 0.9, p 11 = 0.6, p 21 = 0.2, θ 1 = 4, and θ 2 = 3 (actions 0, 1, and 2 in the continuous action model correspond to actions 1, 2, and 3 in the discrete action model). Figs. 4(a) and 4(b) reveal a remarkable fact that the continuation payoff frontier in the discrete model is only inferior to that in the continuous model by at most 0.206 in absolute value or 0.404% in percentage. It is striking that three actions (plus the first-best actions a * 1 and a * 2 ) are all it takes to achieve this level of accuracy. Furthermore, incentive compatibility is guaranteed for the contracts derived in Subsection 4.1, which is difficult to ensure when directly discretizing a continuous action contract. The comparison suggests that in a dynamic adverse selection problem under the ICFB condition, the optimal contracts constructed from discrete actions can be much simpler than the ones constructed from continuous actions (by using just a few actions) and converge to first-best renegotiationproof contracts much faster, with little loss of expected profit. Such a close comparision between discrete and continuous action models is made possible by the fixed-point construction approach.
Conclusion.
In this paper, we present a novel approach for analyzing a dynamic adverse selection model with Markov dynamics by directly constructing the continuation payoff frontier as the fixed point of a functional operator. This method is effective in finding structural properties of the optimal solution. Using it, we are able to generalize the results in Battaglini [4] and Battaglini and Coate [5] to the scenario in which an incentive compatible first-best contract exists. This scenario includes the common case of private values and underscores the trade-off between system efficiency and information rent extraction. In this scenario, the optimal contracts converge to first-best renegotiation-proof contracts, and discretization of the action set leads to little loss of efficiency. These and other properties have strong implications for the design and implementation of optimal contracts.
The results presented in this paper show encouraging evidence that the dynamic adverse selection problem, as complex as it is, still possesses general properties. The solution to the problem under the ICFB condition is explored in this paper. It would be valuable to broaden the investigation to the situation in which this condition is violated (one such example is mentioned at the end of Subsection 3.3). In addition, generalizing the method of this paper to the multi-state case would be of great theoretical and practical value. referees for their invaluable comments and suggestions that helped improve the paper. The author also wishes to thank Rakesh Vohra for hosting his visit to the Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science at Northwestern University in 2008 and participants of the 2008 Dynamic Mechanism Design Workshop at Northwestern University.
Appendix A. Proofs. In this appendix, we prove the propositions and theorems presented in the paper.
Proof of Proposition 3.1. By the definition of ( u, φ) (a) and (u k , φ k ) and the fact that
i , we obtain:
),
The last part of the proposition follows from
Proof of Theorem 3.1. The equivalence between (i) and (ii) is straightforward, as is the equivalence between (iii) and (iv). Thus, it suffices to show the equivalence between (ii) and (iii).
First, suppose that u
2 ) for a first-best policy a * 1 , a * 2 . Define u * 1 and u * 2 as in the theorem: for x ∈ {1, 2}, u * [u] , when applied to any agent payoff interval, does not change the order of the agent's payoffs; hence, to generate the largest interval from [u *
reverses the order of the agent's payoffs; hence, to generate the largest interval, we must let u * and u * 2 = u (a * 2 ) , and thus u *
[u] (u * 1 ) implies that u * 1 and u * 2 are on the opposite sides of u (a * 2 ) (by Proposition 3.1), and thus
. (3) The case in which a * 2 is positive definite but a * 1 is indefinite is symmetrical to case (2), and we still have u 
, which is a contradiction. Thus, we must have u Proof. An edge of φ * y (·) can be described by two endpoints (u , φ y ) and (u , φ y ) that satisfy (i) φ y > φ y , and (ii) u * 1 ≤ u < u if y = 1 or u * 2 ≥ u > u if y = 2. Due to the symmetry, it suffices to consider the edge (line segment) (u , φ 1 )(u , φ 1 )-i.e., the case y = 1, as in Fig. 5 .
2 ), x = 1, 2, and thus Therefore, the (absolute) slopes of (u (a) , φ
If a is positive definite-i.e., p
) is steeper than (u , φ 1 )(u , φ 1 ), as illustrated in Fig. 5(a) . If a is indefinite-i.e., p
) is still steeper than (u , φ 1 )(u , φ 1 ), as in Fig. 5(b) . The same result holds for the case y = 2.
21 ∈ (0, 1) for all actions, the directed extreme-point graph is cycle free, except for the cycle(s) within the first-best component points.
Proof. First, assume that all actions are nonsingular-i.e., p (a) 11 = p (a) 21 . The lemma can be proved by contradiction. Suppose that the graph contains a non-first-best cycle that links z(≥ 2) extreme points. Denote these extreme points by n 1 → n 2 → · · · → n z → n 1 (any member can be the first in the list), where every n i represents a continuation payoff pair (u, φ x ) ∈ R 2 . Clearly, this cycle cannot contain any first-best component point because once the cycle reaches such a point it will be trapped within the first-best component points forever. Let a i denote the action that creates extreme point n i from n i−1 , i = 1, · · · , z (with n 0 = n z ), and x i denote the state of the frontier component φ * xi (·) on which n i lies. That is,
Since the extreme point n 1 is not a first-best component point, there must be an extreme point of φ * x1 (·) immediately above n 1 , denoted by n an extreme point to the frontier component φ * x (·). According to the behavior of singular actions, this extreme point must be descended directly from a first-best point. Because no first-best point can be in a non-first-best cycle, as mentioned above, this extreme point cannot be in a cycle as well. Thus, singular actions can be ignored as for possible cycle formations.
Proof of Theorem 3.2 continued: Because by Lemma A2 there is no cycle in the graph other than the first-best one(s), all extreme points of {φ * x (·)} must be descended from the first-best component points ultimately, and hence they can be created by the algorithm in finite time. x (·) have exactly the same shape. Thus, by simple geometry, as illustrated in Fig. 7 , the relative locations of their tangent points (or edges) under the common tangent must be identical-i.e., j = j -and q (a) points on φ * x (·) change consecutively, except that when the actions change they stay the same; and (iii) actions in A 1 (or A 2 ) contribute to φ * 1 (·) (or φ * 2 (·)) sequentially. By Proposition 4.1 and the above observations, a linear time algorithm to construct φ * 1 (·) and φ * 2 (·) can be designed. We define the following operation: given a point q and a line segment l, the operation shift(q, l) creates a point q below q such that the line segmentis parallel to l with equal length. The algorithm is the following: (ii) Note that as in the discrete action setting, the frontier components are determined from the top down, so the points closer to the efficient domain are determined earlier than those farther away. First, suppose the actions are positive definite. Then, we have p 11 − p 21 > 0, x = y, and Therefore, with the two facts established, the frontier components {φ * x (·)} can be uniquely solved from (23) and (24), by starting from the top φ * x (u * x ) = φ * x and moving downward.
Proof of Theorem 4.3. The theorem can be proved in five steps. 1−δ 2 (p11−p21) 2 , x = 1, 2. In both cases, it can be shown that u * 2 < u * 1 .
(2) The peak points {(z (a)
x )} and implicit peak functions {ρ x (·)} can be found as follows. Because u * x = (θ 1 − θ 2 )θ x + δ(p 11 − p 21 )u * y , we have z 
